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that since the Uniform Commercial Code does not accept the present
majority rule, the possibility exists that the present majority rule may
well become the minority in the ensuing years.
KENNETH 0. HUNTINGDON, JR.
WHEN IS TERMINATION OF REALTY BROKER'S AGENCY
IN BAD FAITH?
When a real estate broker finds that after his agency has been
terminated his principal has sold the property involved to the same
person he had previously produced, the broker may well feel that he
has been deprived of a commission unfairly. If he seeks to recover
the commission by litigation, it is likely that he will have to prove that
the principal terminated the agency in bad faith.'
In a recent Maryland decision, Leimbach v. Nicholson,2 the possi-
bility of a principal's acting in bad faith in terminating an agency
relationship divided the state's highest court. Leimbach employed
Nicholson to sell his farm, agreeing to consider any offer procured.
During a period of five or six months Nicholson tried to effect a sale
with the eventual purchaser, but was unsuccessful in doing so because
of price differences and prejudices expressed by Leimbach against
the purchaser's religion. Thinking that a satisfactory arrangement
was impossible at the time, Nicholson tried to interest the prospec-
tive buyer in adjoining property. At about this time, Myerberg, an-
other real estate broker and a close friend of the buyer, brought the
buyer to Leimbach, and within a period of approximately six weeks
the sale was consummated. The sale was made at a higher price than
any offer Nicholson had been able to obtain.8 Myerberg purchased in
"'An agent to whom the principal has made a revocable offer of compensation
if he accomplishes a specified result is entitled to the promised amount if the prin-
.cipal, in order to avoid payment of it, revokes the offer and thereafter the result
is accomplished, the agent's prior efforts being the effective cause thereof." Restate-
ment, Agency § 454 (1933). See also Mechem Outlines Agency § 565 (4 th ed. 1952).
The theory of this rule of law is that a special or fiduciary relationship exists
which affords the principal the power and means to take undue advantage of, or
exercise undue influence over, the agent. A course of dealing between persons so
situated is carefully scrutinized, and if the slightest trace of undue influence or un-
fair advantage is found, redress is given to the injured party. Jordan v. Annex
Corp., 1o9 Va. 625, 64 S.E. 1050 (1909).
2219 Md. 44o, 149 A.2d 411 (1959).
3rhe testimony showed that Nicholson submitted three offers on behalf of the
eventual purchaser, the last being $i1,oo, which was $5,ooo more than the previ-
ous offer and $15,OO more than the first. The sale was effected at the price of
$127,5oo less $5,ooo commission, or a net to Leimbach of $122,500. Id. at 413-14.
CASE COMMENTS
his own name and then assigned to the purchaser, who was the cus-
tomer originally produced by Nicholson. Additional facts tended to
establish that Nicholson was still negotiating with the buyer at the
time of the sale, and any abandonment or cessation of activity on his
part was induced by the misrepresentations made by Leimbach as
to his views regarding the buyer's religion. The jury awarded Nich-
olson $5,ooo as a commission.
The majority of the Supreme Court of Appeals recognized that a
sale made subsequent to the termination of the agency to a customer
initially produced by a real estate broker ordinarily gives rise to an
inference that the termination was made in bad faith. However, the
court held that this inference arises only when the sale is made at a
lower price than the offer obtained by the broker. W"'hen the sale is
made at a higher price than that procured by the broker, no inference
of bad faith arises. Neither Myerberg nor Leimbach had any obliga-
tion to deal through Nicholson since there was no exclusive agency
involved; and even if the evidence permitted an inference that Leim-
bach knew that the buyer was the customer produced by Nicholson, the
result would not be altered. In order to recover, Nicholson must
show facts sufficient to support an allegation of bad faith. The ma-
jority of the court held that as a matter of law Nicholson had not
done this and that therefore the trial court should not have sub-
mitted the issue to the jury.
The dissent took the view that the court could not say, as a matter
of law, that the broker (Nicholson) was not the procuring cause of
sale to the ultimate purchaser because it could not say, again as a mat-
ter of law, that Leimbach had in good" faith discharged the broker
or that the broker had withdrawn voluntarily. The dissent thought
that the decisive inquiry was whether the principal acted in good
or bad faith regardless of whether the sale was at a higher or a lower
price, and that this question of bad faith should be determined by
a jury.
4
The real estate broker is usually a "special agent" and as such is in
a relatively weak position so far as his scope of authority and security
'A broker who is the procuring cause of a transaction consummated by the
principal is entitled to a commission, even though the principal accepts property in
lieu of cash, Kroh v. Rosenberg, 158 Md. 273, 148 Ad. 244 (ig3o), makes a sale
at a higher price or on better terms than he had authorized, Flournoy v. Atlas Oil
Co., 151 La. 222, 91 So. 714 (1922), sells at a lower price than that originally quoted
by him to the broker, Mitchell v. Hughes, 143 Va. 393, 13o S.E. 225 (1925), or al-
though the transaction consummated includes more or less property than the broker
was authorized to sell, purchase, or exchange, Belyeu v. Hudson, 179 Ark. 657, 17
S.W.2d 865 (1929).
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of employment are concerned.5 In the absence of a contract to the
contrary, the principal may terminate the agency at will, sell directly,
and authorize third parties to compete with the agent. Therefore, in
order to afford the broker some protection by way of adequate com-
pensation for his time and effort, courts require that the termination
of an agency be made in good faith. This requirement is strictly
adhered to, and when bad faith is found the courts do not hesitate
to award commissions to the agent. The problem presented in apply-
ing *this doctrine is the determination of what comprises good or bad
faith.6 While this problem remains unsettled, the ultimate question
is usually whether the real estate broker is the procuring cause of
sale.7
There are comparatively few cases in which the agency was termin-
ated with the principal subsequently selling, directly or through a
third party, at a price higher than the broker could obtain. The
majority of these cases conform to the view expressed by the dissent
in Leimbach, i.e., that the question of good or bad faith is one for the
jury.8 This is illustrated by the leading New York case of Goodman
"[Real estate agents] are usually special agents, and their authority is to be
deemed to be strictly limited to that which is either expressly given or necessarily
implied." i Mechem, Agency § 799 (2d ed. 1914). See generally Id. at 797-99. Accord,
Swift v. Erwin, 1o4 Ark. 459, 148 S.W. 267 (1912).
OBlack, Law Dictionary (4th ed. 1951) defines bad faith as: "The opposite of
good faith,' generally implying or involving actual or constructive fraud, or a
design to mislead or deceive another, or a neglect or refusal to fulfill some duty or
some contractual obligation, not prompted by an honest mistake as to one's rights
or duties, but by some interested or sinister motive." See also New Amsterdam Gas.
Co. v. National Baking Co., 117 N.J. Eq. 264, 175 At. 6o9 (1934) (bad faith dis-
tinguished from negligence).
7Restatement, Agency § 445, comments c, e, § 448 (1933); 2 Mechem, Agency §
2435 (2d ed. 1914). See generally Id. at §§ 2430-35, 2442. Accord, Seward v. M. Seward
& Son Co., 91 Conn. 19o, 99 At. 887 (1916); 21 Tul. L. Rev. 137 (1946).
"In the common case of a real estate agent or broker, the ordinary business
understanding, and, therefore, the ordinary rule of law is that the agent becomes
entitled to his commission when he has procured for his client one who is able and
ready and willing to contract with the client on the terms which the latter has
stated to his agent." 4 Williston, Contracts § iooA (rev. ed. 1936). See also Shea
Realty Corp. v. Page & Taylor, iii Va. 490, 69 S.E. 327 (191o). However, when
the agency is terminated in bad faith for the purpose of defeating the broker's
right to commissions, the question of procuring cause of sale does not arise. O'Connell
v. Casey, 2o6 Mass. 521, 92 N.E. 8o4 (191o) (leading case).
sRestatement, Agency § 454 (1933); 2 Mechem, Agency § 2435, 2442 (2d ed.
1914). "The 'bad fath'.., appears to mean no more than that the owner is de-
liberately trying to get the broker's services for nothing, either to avoid payment
of the promised commission, or to give the benefit thereof to a favored buyer or
another broker. Where such a scheme is charged, it will be a question of fact-
and often a very difficult one." Mechem Outlines Agency § 566 (4 th ed. 1952).
Accord, Tahir Erk v. Glenn L. Martin Co., 143 F.2d 232 (4th Cir. 1944); Houston
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v. Marcol9 In that case the broker reported to the seller that he had
received a better offer from his prospective customer. Upon learning
this, the principal terminated his authority and consummated the sale
through another broker at the higher price but at a lower broker's
commission. In awarding the dismissed broker his commission the
court said: "We think that questions of fact arose which required a
submission of the case to the jury."'1 Inferences of bad faith are
much more readily discernible as in this New York case than in the
following cases: when a real estate agent was employed to sell land
at a certain price with a specified sum as his commission and the
principal terminated the agency before the expiration of a reasonable
time, selling directly to the customer produced by the agent;" when
the principal sold directly to the dismissed broker's customer a few
days after the agency had been terminated at a price greater than that
authorized to the broker;12 and when the principal rejected the offer
of the broker's prospect, terminated the agency, and several weeks later
sold the property through another broker at a higher price to the
dismissed broker's customer.' 3 In each of these cases the jury awarded
the broker his commission. Cases have denied the dismissed broker
his commission when the principal gave the broker a fixed or extended
date in which to produce a purchaser and the broker failed to produce
at that time;1 4 when the broker failed to comply with the terms
of a special agency contract; 15 when the customer produced by the
broker was not ready, willing, and able to purchase upon the princi-
pal's terms;' 6 and when the broker had not carried the negotiations
far enough to establish himself as thb procuring cause of sale, as he
had merely introduced the eventual purchaser to his principal.17 It
v. H. G. Wolff & Son Inv. Co., 94 Colo. 73, 28 P.2d 255 (1933); Chicago Title &
Trust Co. v. Guild, 329 Ill. App. 374, 68 N.E.2d 615 (1946); Baskett v. Jones, 189
Ky. 391, 225 S.V. 158 (192o); Steele v. Seth, 211 Md. 323, 127 A.2d 388 (1956); Good-
man v. Marcol, Inc., 261 N.Y. 188, 184 N.E. 755 (1933); Shea Realty Co. v. Page,
111 Va. 490, 69 S.E. 327 (191o). See Annot., 27 A.L.R.2d 1348 (1953).
9261 N.Y. 188, 184 N.E. 755, 756 (1933).
11Id. at 756.
"Holland v. King, 72 Ga. App. 179, 33 S.E.2d 275 (1945).
12McCarthy v. McCarthy, 49 RI. 2oo, 142 At. 14 (1928).
'"O'Connell v. Casey, 2o6 Mass. 520, 92 N.E. 8o4 (191o). See also Viguerie v.
Mathes, io La. App. 246, 120 So. 542 (1929).
uNeal v. Lehman, ii Tax. Civ. App. 461, 34 SAV. 153 (1895).
I'Deckker v. Klingman, 149 Mich. 96, 112 NAV. 727 (1907) (option contract).
15E. A. Strout Realty Agency v. Gargan, 328 Mass. 524, io5 N.E.2d 208 (1952).
'TZeimer v. Antisell, 75 Cal. 509, 17 Pac. 642 (1888); Sibbald v. Bethlehem Iron
Co., 83 N.Y. 378, (1881); Ford v. Gibson, 191 Va. 96, 59 S.E.2d 867 (195o). But see.
Wachtel v. Harkless, 112 Ind. App. 279, 44 N.E.2d 510, 512 (1942), stating that
"introduced" was equivalent to "procured."
i960]
WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. XVII
should be noted that even in these cases in which recovery was denied
the questions of bad faith and procuring cause of sale were held to be
questions of fact for the jury.
In cases in which there is an allegation of bad faith, appellate
courts have proceeded with caution in overruling a jury's finding of
fact. The reason appears to be that the fertility of man's invention
in devising new schemes of fraud is so great and the position of the
principal so superior to the broker's that reasonable men could easily
differ on inferences permissibly flowing from the testimony of the
parties.' 8 The rule laid down by Leimbach would appear harsh be-
cause whenever the sale is at a higher price than the dismissed broker
could obtain, the inferences of bad faith and that the dismissed broker
was the procuring cause of sale may never arise. This rule appears
to differ from that of the other cases on point with Leimbach. The
writers also agree that the decisive inquiry of good or bad faith is a
question of fact for the jury.19
In holding as a matter of law that the facts were insufficient to
permit any inference of bad faith a court accepts as true all testimony
and fair inferences favorable to the right of the broker to recover.2 0
1sSee Leach v. Central Trust Co., 203 Ia. 1O6O, 213 N.W. 777 (1927); Warfield
Natural Gas Co. v. Allen, 248 Ky. 646, 59 S.W.2d 534 (1933). See also 23 Am. Jur.
Fraud & Deceit §§ 1-i9 (1939); Annot., 27 A.L.R.2d 1348 (1943).
"See, e.g., 2 Mechem, Agency §§ 2435, 2442 (2d ed. 1914). Accord, Shannon v.
Gaar, 233 Iowa 38, 6 N.W.2d 3o4 (1942); Clinchy v. Grandview Dairy, Inc., 262 App.
Div. 51, 27 N.Y.S.2d 793 (1941); Feeley v. Mullikin, 269 P.2d 828 (Wash. 1954).
"'There are two possible tests that can be made to prevent a jury from, dis-
regarding the applicable substantive law: (i) the prevailing view in this country
is that in passing upon a motion for a directed verdict the trial judge considers only
the evidence favorable to the respondent, completely disregarding all unfavorable
evidence, and determines whether a reasonable jury, from the evidence viewed in
its most favorable light for the respondent, could find every fact exists which must
exist to sustain his case; (2) the trial judge may direct a verdict against the respon-
dent upon all the evidence in the case, i.e., evidence both favorable and unfavorable
to the respondent, and if the judge determines, although there is evidence of
every fact which the respondent must establish, that he would be duty bound to
set aside a verdict for the respondent should the jury return one for him because
it would be against the weight of the evidence. The latter is the minority view
and might be considered undesirable because under it the judge passes on the
credibility of witnesses. See Note, 31 Calif. L. Rev. 454, 46o (1943). Maryland ad-
heres to the prevailing view. Ebling v. Brewer, 154 Md. 29o , 141 At. 363 (1928).
"It is the established rule that in passing upon whether there is sufficient evi-
dence to submit an issue to the jury we need look only to the evidence and rea-
sonable inferences which tend to support the case of a litigant against whom a
peremptory instruction has been given." Wilkerson v. McCarthy. 336 U.S. 53, 57
(1949) (expressing the prevailing view). See also Pennsylvania R.R. v. Chamber-
lain, 288 U.S. 333 (1933)- When it is said that there is no evidence to go to the jury,
this is not literally true, but only means that there is none that should reason-
ably satisfy a jury that the fact sought to be proved is established. Blum v. Fresh
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It is doubtful if this was done in Leimbach. For example, it is doubt-
ful whether the agency was actually terminated. Nicholson contended
and Leimbach admitted that if Nicholson had in fact abandoned the
agency this was due to Leimbach's arbitrary, if not bad faith, mis-
representation that he would not sell to the customer produced by
Nicholson. 21 It would seem that it may be reasonably inferred from
these facts that Nicholson's efforts were thwarted by Leimbach, and
as the Goodman case stated on this point, "[N]o one can avail himself
of the non-performance of a condition precedent, who has himself oc-
casioned its non-performance."2 2 The customer produced by Nicholson
did in fact buy Leimbach's farm; therefore, he was surely more than
casually interested in the property. An introduction of the eventual
purchaser to the principal without more is insufficient to establish the
broker as the procuring cause of sale.23 However, it may be fairly in-
ferred from the broker's testimony that he carried the negotiations
as far as he was able before Leimbach's interference. Therefore, the
jury should be allowed to determine the issue. 24 If Leimbach had not
manifested such strong prejudices against the purchaser, it appears
likely that Nicholson would have been able to effect the sale; such an
inference flows from the testimony.25
Anyone who relies upon the existence of agency has the burden of
proving it. He must not only prove that it exists, but he must show
the type of agency. 20 When alleging a fraudulent or bad faith agency
termination, the agent must allege facts sufficient to substantiate
his claim. Leimbach appears to lay down a rule of doubtful validity
in denying that ordinary inferences of bad faith do not arise when
a subsequent sale is made at a higher price.
PAUL H. COFFEY, JR.
Grown Preserve Corp., 292 N.Y. 241, 54 N.E.2d 8o9 (1944). See also Croft v. Snidow,
183 Va. 649, 33 S.E.2d 2o8 (1945) (demurrer to the evidence); Klingstein v. Eagle,
193 Va. 350, 68 S.E.2d 547 (1952) (motion to strike the evidence).
=149 A.2d at 413.
=184 N.E. at 756.
"See cases cited note 17 supra.
26149 A.2d at 413.
ZThe facts in Leimbach, see note 5 supra, appear to allow a fair inference that
the customer produced by Nicholson was so interested in Leimbach's property that
he continually increased his offer. Therefore, the consummation of a sale ap-
peared to be immediately foreseeable and was thwarted only by the religious
prejudices of Leimbach against the customer. This inference is further strengthened
by the fact that the customer did in fact buy the property. Therefore, Leimbach ap-
pears to come under the rule of the O'Connell case, note 21 supra.
mSee 1 Mechem, Agency §§ 5o, 69 (2d ed. 1914).
